The en banc DC Circuit today rejected the argument that there is a due process right to access certain types of experimental drugs.
In footnote 5 of the opinion, the majority responds to the dissent regarding the scope of the right that is being asserted in this case:
The dissent has recast the Alliance’s proposed right away
from the terms used in its briefs and oral argument—a right to access
investigational new drugs—into a right “to try to save one’s life,”
which has “its textual anchor in the right to life [expressed in the Fifth
Amendment].” Dissent at 2-3. Regardless of how it is described, we
must examine the proposed right under Glucksberg, which specifically
cautions against the type of broad generalization the dissent now
employs. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (requiring a “‘careful
description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest”). If the
asserted right is so broad that it protects a person’s efforts to save his
life, it might subject to strict scrutiny any government action that
would affect the means by which he sought to do so, no matter how
remote the chance of success. The Supreme Court rejected a similar
attempt to broadly define the right at issue in Reno v. Flores when it
refused to accept the petitioner’s definition as the “freedom from
physical restraint” and instead cast the right as the “right of a child
who has no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, and for
whom the government is responsible, to be placed in the custody of a
willing-and-able private custodian rather than of a
government-operated or government-selected child-care institution.”
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). The dissent suffers from
the same flaw in arguing that this is about the right to save one’s life,
because, in the end, this case is about the right to access experimental
and unproven drugs in an attempt to save one’s life, which we
conclude under Glucksberg is not deeply rooted in our Nation’s
history and traditions. By describing too broadly at the outset a
proposed right that will cover the Alliance’s more narrow claim, the
dissent fails Glucksberg’s threshold requirement of a carefully
described right. We need not pursue the arguments that follow that
initial misstep.
Emphasis added.
I had noted the importance of the way the right was described in this earlier post. The dissent in today's case says the majority's perspective on this issue betrays "a flawed conception of the right claimed by the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs and a stunning misunderstanding of the stakes."
The court's opinion contains an interesting description of early American drug regulation practices, starting on p. 16. Additionally, it touches on the issue of criminal drug controls, using that issue to attack the Alliance's position:
[O]ne might argue that, because
Congress did not significantly regulate marijuana until 1937,
relatively late in the constitutional day, see Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1, 11 (2005), there must be a tradition of protecting
marijuana use. Because Congress did not regulate narcotics
until 1866 when it heavily taxed opium, a drug created long
before our Nation’s founding, see United States v. Moore, 486
F.2d 1139, 1215-16, 1218 n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, J.,
dissenting), it must be that individuals have a right to acquire
and use narcotics free from regulation. . . . But this is most certainly not the law. A
prior lack of regulation suggests that we must exercise care in
evaluating the untested assertion of a constitutional right to be
free from new regulation. But the lack of prior governmental
regulation of an activity tells us little about whether the activity
merits constitutional protection: “The fact that powers long
have been unexercised well may call for close scrutiny as to
whether they exist; but if granted, they are not lost by being
allowed to lie dormant, any more than nonexistent powers can
be prescripted by an unchallenged exercise.”
The dissent, too, musters a bunch of historical arguments about the right to defend one's own life at common law, and these seem just about as compelling as the regulatory arguments put forth by the majority. All of which goes to show, in my opinion, that whether something is a right “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” is a standard that is extremely malleable. The outcome of such a test has far less to do with history than either side would like to pretend and far more to do with the pragmatic considerations motivating each side.
At any rate, given the way the majority defines the right, it's no surprise that the court applies rational basis review to the FDA regulatory regime and concludes that the regime survives that review.